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1 Introduction
In rural India, politics is often considered to be
largely the preserve of politicians and their
affiliates. With the devolution of powers to local
government (constitutional amendment passed in
1992)1 and the conduct of regular elections this
perception is gradually changing. Reservations for
historically marginalised groups like the Scheduled
Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs)2 and women
have also broadened their opportunities for
political participation. Increasingly, poor people
are harnessing the potential of devolution by
participating in various forms of political action
(Alsop, Krishna and Sjoblom 2001; Bardhan,
Mitra, Mookherjee and Sarkar 2009). Democratic
decentralisation is also providing NGOs3 at the
grass roots with an opportunity to play a more
explicit role in matters relating to politics and
local government (Chhotray 2008).
This article unpacks the relationship of poor
people and a grass roots NGO4 with rural local
government. It describes the growing engagement
of vulnerable and marginalised people with
politics in this context, and explains how greater
political participation allows for more influence
over the functioning of local government and the
disbursal of material benefits from it. In doing so,
it highlights that even those who are not keen or
interested in such involvement now find that this
engagement is becoming a necessity. The article
draws on material from my doctoral thesis which
was a comparative study of the interface of gram
panchayats, grass roots NGOs and poor people in
two south Indian states. It takes an in-depth look
at the political dynamics and outcomes within one
of the gram panchayats in the south Indian state of
Karnataka.
There is growing evidence that understanding the
role and importance of politics is central to
improving the lives of poor people (Green 2008;
DFID 2010). In these studies, politics is not
examined through a rational-actor lens (where
actors pursue strategic self-interest), but is studied
by employing a more substantive approach which
examines prevailing socioeconomic relations and
underlying structural conditions. Using this
approach is important while studying events at the
local level as research suggests that the impact of
local-level politics on democracy and development
needs to be critically analysed, for it has the
potential to both curtail and foster substantive
change (Harriss, Stokke and Törnquist 2004).
In this article, I have used the term politics in
three different senses. Firstly, I have used it in
reference to institutional electoral practices. The
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two other senses in which I have used it relate to
the additional ways in which gram panchayat-level
informants interpreted these terms. In the more
limited sense, it refers to competition between
cliques. In the more substantive sense, it refers
to the interplay of interests and forces that seek
to control authority in village society in order to
gain influence or retain command over decision-
making, resources and benefits.5 The account of
Donnapalli gram panchayat describes and explains
how politics at the grass roots has moved beyond
institutional electoral practices to include a
gradual reconfiguration of traditional
hierarchies – in ways that allow poor people to
have access and influence over decision-making
and the distribution of resources and benefits.
The article has four sections. Section 2 provides
information about the research context in
Karnataka, methods and mode of analysis,
together with reflections on the research process.
Section 3 describes the research setting at the
district and lower levels of government, unpacks
the experiences in Donnapalli gram panchayat,
and discusses the findings. Finally, the conclusion
highlights the key lessons.
2 Background and details of the research
2.1 The context in Karnataka
Like many other societies in the world, rural
society in India has been intertwined with the
practice of politics – both in its institutional and
substantive forms. In much of southern India,
political power was traditionally concentrated in
the hands of the village ‘headman’ who belonged
to either an upper caste6 or a dominant caste,7 and
also in a more limited sense with leaders from
other caste/tribe and religious groupings
(Mandlebaum 1970). Post-independence, the
authority and influence (especially over panchayats)
of the headman and other leaders is gradually
eroding (Robinson 1988; Krishna 2007). This has
in part been aided by the development and
expansion of democratic institutions and practices.
The constitutional amendment in 1992 which gave
states the responsibility to devolve powers to local
government has further extended opportunities
for vulnerable and marginalised people to take up
leadership positions and influence the functioning
of panchayats (Kudva 2006).
However, attempts at decentralisation have varied
across the Indian states as their governments are
free to determine the design, scope and extent of
devolution of resources and power – provided they
adhere to a set of uniform requirements. During
the period of my study (1994–2006),8 the south
Indian state of Karnataka has made more efforts
than many other states to strengthen local
government (Mathew and Buch 2000). Both parties
that headed governments during this term (the
Congress and Janata Dal (Secular) [JD(S)]) have
adopted a liberal, hands-off approach to panchayats;
and have devolved a measure of funds and powers
to them (Meenakshisundaram 2005). They have
also been broadly supportive of NGO involvement
in panchayat-related matters (Hansen 1999).
Although Karnataka scores over many other
states in terms of political and administrative
devolution; in terms of finances (until the 2003
amendments), and government officials’
accountability to these institutions, its efforts
have been inadequate. However, the change in
financial allocations in 2003 has meant that
Karnataka’s gram panchayats now receive about
50 per cent of the total transfers compared to the
two upper tiers.
2.2 Research methods and reflections
2.2.1 Methodology and assessment
In order to evaluate the experiences of poor
people in Donnapalli gram panchayat, I use both
qualitative and quantitative data. The
qualitative data is drawn from semi-structured
interviews and participant observation, and
provides an understanding of the context and
changing dynamics. The quantitative data
compares responses of survey respondents
(20 poor people)9 across 20 key questions. The
experiences are assessed by focusing on the level
of political participation and material benefits
attained at a specific time during 2005–06.
The first dimension is evaluated by examining
achievements with respect to (1) the awareness of
poor people in relation to different aspects of
panchayat-related political participation, (2) the
physical practices associated with this political
participation (voting, contacting elected
representatives, petitioning and protesting), and
(3) the effectiveness of this political participation
– assessing whether the active utilisation of voice
has helped to shape the dynamics within the
panchayat or the decisions and practices of
individuals (citizens, elected functionaries, leaders
and officials) and groups. In other words, I assess
the awareness, voice and influence of poor people.
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The second dimension relates to the acquisition
of panchayat-related material benefits – both
individual and community. I primarily examine
benefits that are provided by the lowest tier of
panchayats. Individual benefits include houses,
pensions and daily-wage labour on various
employment projects. Collective benefits include
the provision of roads, potable water facilities
and street lights.
Aside from collecting data at the gram panchayat
level, I also conducted interviews with key
informants at the intermediate panchayat, district
panchayat and state level. In addition, I analysed
information available online and in print media.
Data from these different avenues helped to
provide a detailed and balanced picture of the
dynamics and outcomes at the grass roots.
In the next sub-section, I reflect on my experiences
while conducting fieldwork and analysing data. I
have discussed these experiences in some length as
part of the aim of this IDS Bulletin is to shed light
on the experiences of doctoral students while
conducting research and highlight the ways in
which they have dealt with various methodological
issues and challenges. These reflections also help to
situate the findings in Section 3.
2.2.2 Reflections on fieldwork and data analysis
During my time in the habitations, I lived in the
houses of poor people (mainly members of NGO-
affiliated village groups). It was important to
situate myself in the village, not only to get a
more authentic flavour of the everyday
experiences of citizens but also for reasons
relating to data collection. Poor people
(invariably, daily-wage labourers) would be out at
work during the day, and political leaders would
be accessible mostly in the late evenings and
early mornings. On the whole, people were very
welcoming. They were interested to know why I
was doing the study and what my background
was. Interviewees (especially poor people) would
often ask me what I was going to achieve by
conducting this research, why I would want to
stay in a poor person’s house, and how they
would benefit from my findings. At the start of
my stay, some respondents were unsure about my
research, but staying in the village and having
local contacts helped to dispel most doubts.
I speak the local language Telugu,10 which was
useful to conduct interviews and interpret
discussions. In general, there was generous
cooperation from the interviewees, but there
were some instances when people were
suspicious about participating or unsure about
responding. For example in the gram panchayat
under study, a few of the senior political leaders
from the main village were unsure of my claim of
being a researcher as they suspected that I was
an investigative journalist. Some respondents
gave politically correct answers, or under-
reported, or made inflated claims. A few of the
respondents, like well-known political leaders or
senior NGO staff, were seasoned interviewees. In
order to get reliable data, I had to be careful
about how I worded my questions and steered
the course of the interview. I also had to factor in
the positionality of interviewees themselves. So,
to reduce biases, I informally ascertained the
political leanings and reliability of potential
interviewees (wherever possible). To minimise
‘recall’-related biases, I provided a point of
reference or memory-aid by mentioning a
significant event or individual from the
particular period or year.
Government staff and elected functionaries at the
gram panchayat level were often reticent about
sharing minutes, audit reports, baseline data,
muster rolls and financial information in relation
to panchayats. For instance, the Donnapalli
panchayat secretary (government-appointed
administrative staff) was very reluctant to share
financial reports and minutes from the gram
panchayat meetings. He kept saying that the files
were not available as they were with the
auditors.11 I was finally able to examine these files
after senior political leaders from within the
panchayat put pressure on him to produce the files.
In many cases, the problem of paucity of
information was compounded by the fact that the
available material was outdated, missing, lost,
inaccurate, doctored, inconsistent, insufficient or
incomplete. So, I was cautious in my use of
secondary sources of information. These
limitations reinforced the importance of
conducting semi-structured interviews. Similarly,
obtaining secondary sources of information from
the NGO under study had to be carefully
negotiated, and was often contingent on the
quality of my personal rapport with senior staff.
During fieldwork, I was aware that my own
positionality of being a young, urban, middle-class,
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educated, married Indian woman, who was
researching politically sensitive issues, would
affect the research process. At the same time,
being an urban woman student had its advantages
at the habitation level, in that it afforded greater
private access to other women while also allowing
fairly open access to interviews with men.
While analysing data and writing up findings, I
was mindful that my own values, preconceptions,
and assumptions could influence the findings of
the research. In particular, my interpretation of
data relating to people’s perception on issues
relating to poverty, politics and change would be
affected by my own ‘theoretical, political and
personal concerns’ (Booth, Leach and Tierney
2006: 3). These concerns had the potential to
both enrich and bias findings, and so it was often
hard to strike the right balance.
One of the key findings that this research
process was able to highlight was the growing
role of politics in the everyday lives of poor
people. In the next section, I describe how
politics plays a critical role in their lives in
relation to participating in panchayat-related
activities and accessing material benefits.
3 Unpacking experiences in Donnapalli gram
panchayat
3.1 Background – Chikballapur district and NGO
Akravati
This article focuses on a gram panchayat located in
Chikballapur district.12 This district is interior,
backward, semi-arid and drought-prone with a
high dependence on well (open and bore)
irrigation. There are no major rivers, reservoirs
or canals within the districts. The economy is
primarily agrarian and the dominant mode is
rain-fed agriculture. Within village society, the
traditionally powerful community are the
Vokkaligas – a dominant caste. They are a
peasant farming caste that belongs to the Shudra
varna (category). However, since families within
these caste groupings are often landed and have
significant traditional influence in the village,
they have a higher status compared to other
castes that fall within the Shudra bracket.
Chikballapur has many small NGOs that work on
a variety of rural development issues but some are
short-lived and run by unscrupulous operators or
are financed by local political leaders who view
them as a way to amass funds from donors. Most
of the ‘credible’ NGOs work on service delivery
issues. This article examines the role of a large,
long-established NGO called NGO Akravati13 that
works with poor people in rural areas through the
multi-pronged approach of conscientisation,
mobilisation and service delivery. It has been
working on issues relating to panchayats from the
late 1980s. NGO Akravati works in about 900
habitations covering four different legislative
constituencies (linked to the state government’s
Lower House of directly elected representatives).
The NGO is a formal (with salaried employees),
mainly donor-funded (international) collective. It
operates through a sangha (membership-based
village group facilitated by the NGO) which is a
federation and a separate legal entity. The sangha
is largely made up of daily-wage labour families,
many of whom are from the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. There is a close link between
the NGO and the sangha as more than half of the
NGO staff are drawn from it. With respect to local
government, NGO Akravati has disseminated
information, mobilised sangha members to contest
seats and make demands on the panchayats, and
provided training on related issues.
The political contest in this district is mainly
between the Communist Party of India (Marxist)
[CPI(M)]14 and the Congress party. All tiers of
elections display a high degree of political
competition with increasingly narrow margins of
victory. Aside from the three-tiered panchayats,
the district is carved into five different legislative
constituencies. Each member or MLA (Member
of Legislative Assembly) is associated with a
single-member legislative constituency at the
sub-district level and is elected for a period of
five years. MLAs command significant influence
over the local bureaucracy as they have powers to
orchestrate transfers of government officials
within their constituency, especially the
Executive Officer (EO) – the senior-most official
of the taluk panchayat (the intermediate tier), and
gram panchayat secretaries.
3.2 Maddilpalli Legislative Constituency
Donnapalli, the gram panchayat under study, is
located in Maddilpalli legislative constituency.
Here, the same CPM leader (male, Vokkaliga)
was an MLA in both the 1994 and 2004 term
whereas the independent (affiliated to the
Congress party) candidate (male, Baljiga)15 was an
MLA in 1999. Aside from differing political party
affiliations, the difference in caste between the
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two main contestants has contributed to a degree
of caste polarisation in assembly elections. In
addition, whereas the CPM leader’s term is
normally associated with a heightened degree of
tension in the villages, brow-beating of the
bureaucracy and clear party favouritism in
awarding ‘contracts’ and benefits; the Congress
affiliated candidate’s (referred to as a rebel-Congress
candidate locally)16 term is considered to be more
relaxed, non-intrusive and accommodative. In
part, this is because the latter’s support base is
partially made up of sangha members associated
with NGO Akravati. So, when he is in power, the
senior leaders of the sangha together with the
senior management of the NGO are able to exert
some amount of pressure on him to ensure that
their members benefit from panchayats and that
there is no wilful obstruction on his part.17
However, this open support to the rebel-Congress
candidate has driven a wedge between the CPM
MLA and the sangha supporters.
During the study period, the political party-in-
power in the taluk panchayat in Maddilpalli has
often been at odds with the ruling MLA. This
‘opposition’ has ensured that no party is able to
completely dominate the political scene, and
spoils and benefits are distributed to supporters
across the divide. However, this has not always
translated into positive gains for marginalised and
vulnerable people. Although both the MLA and
the intermediate panchayat members have tried to
channel benefits to their vote bases, they have
often been thwarted by intra-party politics and
local village dynamics. In addition, the rotation of
reservations for the post of chairpersons in taluk
panchayats (every 20 months within a five-year
term) has increased opportunities for defections,
generating further instability in planning and
implementing panchayat policies.
3.3 The growing relationship with politics (1994–2006)
Donnapalli is a remote gram panchayat that covers
12 habitations and 1,260 households. NGO
Akravati has been operating here since the early
1990s on a range of issues relating to rural
development and democratisation. It works with
small and poor peasant families in seven out of the
12 habitations, through the medium of sanghas.
This gram panchayat is the seat of a large
landowning, dominant caste (Vokkaliga) family. It
also has a sizeable concentration of Scheduled
Caste and Schedule Tribe households. In the past,
most of these families were under the control of
the big landowning family. NGO Akravati found
it particularly hard to build a sangha in the main
village where the most powerful members of the
family live. Furthermore, it is located in a CPM
stronghold, which has helped to ensure that
intermediate and district panchayat members
across all three terms18 were almost all CPM
supporters. Despite this, at the gram panchayat
level, there has been some support for the
Congress as a section of the big family supports
this political party.
The family had de facto control over the panchayat
till the middle of the 2000 electoral term. They
ensured that gram panchayat meetings and gram
sabhas (village assemblies) were a sham, and they
successfully curtailed the dispersion of material
benefits to most poor people. Although members
within this powerful family had different political
party affiliations, the covert understanding was
that power should remain within the family. So, in
the 1994 gram panchayat term, when the reservation
category19 for the post of president was allotted to
the SCs, an illiterate lady from this community
was installed as the president. However, the family
faced more resistance in the next term.
In the first 30 months of the 2000 term,20 a male
Scheduled Caste member was elected21 as
president. In the intervening period, the gram
panchayat had witnessed the rise of many small-
time leaders and political aspirants. The big
family was increasingly aware of the threat that
these new leaders (some of whom were from
marginalised castes, like the new Scheduled
Caste president) posed to their traditional
authority, and the difficulties of co-opting the
more vociferous aspirants. This defiance had
been evident in the more intense contestation for
panchayat council (referred to locally as ward
member) seats between the two main political
parties in the gram panchayat elections of 2000. In
the 1994 elections, there were few contests and
more unanimous nominations:
There was more interest in panchayat elections
in the 2000 term. Contestants felt that being
a ward member gave them access to material
benefits and a chance to be a leader. And as
for the voters, even people who would not
normally vote felt that they could use their
vote to bargain for some panchayat benefits.
(Elected male member, pers. comm. 2006)22
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At the start of the next 30 months, when the
category was announced as general (open to all
communities), a young educated dominant caste
man23 was chosen as the new president. Unlike
presidents of the past, this candidate was
unwilling to toe the line, and gradually began to
strike out on his own. He tried to build a base
around the backward castes (part of the Shudra
varna), and also channelled community and
individual material benefits from the gram
panchayat to the poorer families (across the caste-
divide), including sangha households. Although he
lacked support from the intermediate and
district panchayat members (CPM supporters),
the Congress-affiliated president was able to
accumulate a sizeable amount of additional
material resources for the gram panchayat from
the Congress-affiliated MLA.
The dominant caste leader from the main village
was highly displeased with this insubordination
and tried to engineer a no-confidence motion
against him by bribing Congress-affiliated ward
members to defect to the opposition CPM, and
influencing the CPM-affiliated panchayat secretary
(government official attached to the panchayat).
The leader also received tacit support from the
ex-MLA, who belonged to the CPM. At this stage,
the young president turned for support to his new
base amongst the backward castes and sangha
members. In response, the sangha functionaries at
the gram panchayat and taluk level, with the backing
of the NGO, the ruling Congress-affiliated MLA
and taluk-level Congress leaders; called for a major
strike on the day of the no-confidence motion.
On the day… about 2000 people from across
the taluk came for a strike and prevented the
opposition ward members from entering the
gram panchayat office. Most of these people who
came for the strike belonged to the sangha.
(Elected male member, pers. comm. 2006)24
It was this show of strength that changed the
tide in favour of the sangha. By the time of the
next gram panchayat elections in 2005, the sangha
had expanded membership within Donnapalli.
Five years ago in the 2000 elections we realised
that coverage of sangha members was less in the
villages of the panchayat. So, in the last elections
[2005] we made alliances with the neutral
population and encouraged them to join the
sangha and that is how we managed to win the
necessary votes and get so many elected
members this time. Also the rich, higher caste
people like S___ Reddy are seeking alliances
with us because of the strength of the group.
This has positive benefits for us. (Sangha
functionary, pers. comm. 2006)25
Some of the poor people, who had been reluctant
or indifferent to any engagement with panchayats,
now saw the value and results of involvement and
collective mobilisation. They could see that it
could challenge the dominance of traditional
elites. More importantly, they felt that in order
to secure material benefits and influence over
the panchayats they needed to participate in
political actions:
We need politics for development. There is a
difference between asking someone else and
getting things ourselves. For so long, we have
had to approach B___ (dominant caste leader)
for anything related to panchayats. So we joined
the sangha because we thought that as a group
we could bargain better and have more control
over the running of the panchayat. We don’t
really want to get involved in politics but we
have to because all of the decisions are being
made on the basis of political party
affiliations. Also, the gram panchayat is getting
more funds, so poor families like us need to be
able to influence its functioning if we want to
get access to benefits. (Key informant, pers.
comm. 2006)26
After the 2005 panchayat election, the sangha
functionaries negotiated with the ward members,
and local leaders (Congress supporters) to
ensure that their sangha member, an illiterate
female from the Shudra varna was elected as
president. She has been able to channel benefits
to poorer families, especially within the sangha;
but has had to balance that with appeasing
powerful Congress supporters within the
panchayat. Placating these local leaders has
become trickier with the increase in financial
allocations to the gram panchayats, as they are
eager to cash in on contracts. Although sangha
members are trying to ensure that the new
president remains accountable to them, there is
already evidence that cracks are developing in
this relationship.
The above description of the dynamics in
Donnapalli panchayat highlights the growing role,
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relevance and practice of politics in the lives of
poor people. Aside from voting and having a
general awareness about panchayats, they are also
campaigning in elections, voicing demands,
mobilising in groups and taking part in
confrontational action. This is borne out in the
survey findings too. Most respondents are aware
about the basic role and functions of panchayats
and have made some demands. Those that are
members of the sangha have shown more interest
than others in participating in campaigning,
mobilising and protests. Individual demands for
daily-wage labour, houses and pensions have not
always been met, but they have had more success
with the provision of collective benefits like
potable water and roads. In addition, the
qualitative data indicate that sangha mobilisation
has made a difference in terms of members
gaining priority in the distribution of individual
benefits. Their petitions and campaigns have
also helped to secure the provision of collective
benefits like potable drinking water.
The account of Donnapalli also brings out the
NGO’s role in building the political capabilities
of sangha members. NGO Akravati has been able
to mobilise them to make demands, participate
in protests and strikes, contest elections, and
capture a sizeable share of the seats so that they
can influence decision-making within the gram
panchayat. In order to do that it has disseminated
relevant information, trained sangha functionaries,
and networked with various political leaders and
government officials. Thus, working on panchayat-
related issues has necessitated greater involvement
in political matters. At times, this has led to
confrontations with various leaders and groups
whose interests have been affected by the growing
awareness and strength of sangha members and
their supporters. The NGO has dealt with any
threats of violence and reprisal by drawing on the
support of sangha members, lawyers, and officials
and politicians at higher levels of government.
At the village level in Donnapalli, sangha
members have had to balance considerations of
employment and family, while voicing demands
and participating in confrontational action. In
some cases, village-level leaders affiliated to the
CPM have tried to co-opt sangha functionaries or
intimidate their families. NGO staff feel that
this tension and antagonism is part of the
process of redefining traditional boundaries and
bringing about change:
Sangha functionaries and members have to
reconfigure existing power relationships at
the grass roots themselves. This is a slow
process and it can have many setbacks. We
can provide support from the outside through
training, campaigns and legal aid but the
battle is primarily theirs. (NGO head, pers.
comm. 2005)27
In the next sub-section, I elaborate on these
viewpoints and findings, and highlight the links
between politics and poor people in relation to
local government institutions.
3.4 Discussing and situating findings
Over the study period, the augmentation of
powers and funds to panchayats has helped to usher
in greater political competition and incremental
social change in Donnapalli. Although the main
dominant caste family still wields some power on
the social and economic fronts, their command
over local politics has suffered a serious blow.
Earlier, they dictated the terms but now control
has shifted to a wider group. The leader from the
family has to bargain and compete with sangha and
other political party leaders from traditional lower
castes in order to influence decision-making
within the gram panchayat:
After this system of elections, things have
changed completely. Now people don’t listen
to B____. Now there is no unity in village. In
the past there was just one leader. For justice
they might still come to me for a decision, or
rather a group of us. But we don’t have much
say as far as politics is concerned. (Key
informant, pers. comm. 2006)28
This rise in political competition and the
representation of leadership from non-traditional
groups at the grass roots has also been documented
in recent scholarship. Chandrashekhar (2009)
and Mullen (2011) draw on village-level data to
highlight the role of political competition in the
context of democratic decentralisation, and Alm
(2010) draws attention to the emergence of
leaders from non-traditional backgrounds.
Although there continues to be much scholarship
about the capture of local institutions by
traditional elites (see for instance Dutta 2012;
Palaniswamy and Krishnan 2012), there is
evidence that democratic decentralisation is
gradually helping to allow for a fairer
Abraham The Necessity of Engaging with Politics: Lessons from the Grass Roots in South India62
IDSB45.2-3 text.qxd  05/02/2014  15:39  Page 62
distribution of panchayat-related benefits
(Daftary 2010). This article builds on Daftary’s
research in Gujarat to highlight the growing role
of leaders within panchayat settings who come
from non-traditional groups. In Donnapalli, some
leaders from marginalised communities are
financially better-off than others from within
their group, but in other cases these emerging
leaders are from poor backgrounds and are
associated with the sangha. Those from the latter
group are forming new political identities –
although they are not members of any political
party, they strategically choose to affiliate
themselves with a particular party in order to
gain resources and influence the functioning of
panchayats. Thus, as Cornwall, Robins and Von
Lieres suggest, new forms of public engagement
in democratic arenas are helping to create new
political identities (2011: 8–9).
Leaders from the sangha utilise its collective
strength to bargain for material benefits,
participate in social and electoral campaigns,
and increasingly to secure election victories. This
strength has also enabled candidates from the
sangha who are standing for panchayat elections to
spend less on elections compared to their
competitors. However, as the article illustrates,
once they are in positions of power their
accountability to the sangha is more fluid and this
has potential knock-on effects on the
cohesiveness of the sangha. As the amount of
funds available for the use of gram panchayats
increases there are greater possibilities of rifts
appearing between sangha members and
leaders.29 In addition, the experience of
Donnapalli from 2003 onwards suggests that
larger financial allocations to the lowest tier
attract small-time leaders who are eager to make
money on contracts for implementing works.
A rise in the number of local leaders, the
associated level of political competition, and the
devolution of funds has also meant that some of
these leaders and elected panchayat functionaries
are more readily switching party affiliations in
order to further their ends. This fluidity in
political identities is on the rise and is connected
to the augmentation of resources and powers
within government institutions, especially at the
lowest tier. Other emerging leaders at the grass
roots have built on existing political party
affiliations and acquired skills as political
entrepreneurs in order to boost their chances of
being re-elected or furthering their political
careers. The young gram panchayat president from
the 2003 term and the lady president from the
2005 term have developed alliances with
politicians and government officials at higher
tiers of government and used these to bargain
and acquire material benefits for their
supporters. They have also maintained and built
their links with local leaders and the sangha by
awarding contracts and providing information
and assistance.
This entrepreneurship has also been exhibited
by leaders from within the sangha. By formulating
electoral alliances and brokering votes for
development, sangha leaders from vulnerable and
marginalised backgrounds have learnt how to use
statutory provisions and electoral strategies to
alter the balance of power and acquire benefits
for their members. These changes in the nature
of local leadership and political competition
build on the recent work of Manor (2010) who
has documented the emergence of small-time
political entrepreneurs and the fluidity of
political identities in India.
In Donnapalli panchayat, these changes reflect
the growing relevance of politics in the everyday
lives of its people. As mentioned in the
introductory section of this article, I have used
the word politics in three different senses –
firstly in relation to institutional electoral
practices, secondly in terms of competition
between cliques, and thirdly as the interplay of
interests and forces that seek to control
authority in village society. The Donnapalli
account highlights that all three associations
with the term are gaining importance. Firstly,
over the period under study, the regular conduct
of elections, and the incremental devolution of
powers and resources have meant that there is
better awareness about various forms of
institutional electoral practices and greater
participation in related physical practices.
Secondly, the discussion relating to political
competition highlights the growing rivalry
amongst groups within the panchayat –
particularly between the sangha and CPM
supporters. Thirdly, the strategies and collective
power of the sangha have made it a force to
reckon with, and have helped members to
increase participation in institutional electoral
practices and forge alliances in order to
gradually alter the power equations and
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distributional outcomes within the panchayat. In
doing this, they have been able to highlight the
role that substantive politics can play in
improving the lives of poor people.
Sangha members, most of whom are poor and
from the Scheduled Castes, have realised that
harnessing the economic potential of panchayats
requires a deeper engagement with politics – not
just as individuals but more importantly as a
group. Although they have had limited success in
terms of securing individual benefits, their
protests and petitions have led to the provision of
certain collective material benefits. As one of the
sangha functionaries explains:
The reason why we decided to have politics as
an integral part of the sangha was to get
benefits from government without having to
bend over backwards begging someone to get
benefits for us. Panchayats and sanghas are both
needed… Sanghas give us identity and
collective power… [but] some things sanghas
cannnot give us like hostel seats, houses,
water supply, and street lights. (Sangha
functionary, pers. comm. 2006)30
The advantages of engaging in collective
processes with respect to local government
institutions have also been brought out in
Sharma and Sudarshan’s study of women’s
groups in north India (2010). They argue that
such processes provide opportunities for women’s
groups to build networks across villages, support
each other in times of conflict and confrontation,
and reinforce norms of equality and inclusiveness
through debate and negotiation. The ability of
these traditionally marginalised groups to
participate more effectively in panchayats through
collective efforts is similar to the sangha’s
capacity to influence the functioning of panchayats
through various forms of political participation
(e.g. voting, contacting elected representatives,
campaigning, petitioning and carrying out
strikes). This participation of sangha members is
both necessary and useful. Priyadarshee and
Hossain (2010) argue that in order to make the
functioning of panchayats more relevant to the
deprived population it is important to find ways
to enhance the participation of poor people.
The sangha has also recognised that more
substantive political participation in panchayats
requires going beyond gaining awareness and
exercising voice to actually influencing the
functioning of the panchayat. As a group, the
sangha have attempted to do that by capturing a
majority of the seats in the council. They have
tried to expand membership within the
panchayat, and form alliances with groups and
leaders from different castes and economic
backgrounds. However, these alliances have
made it difficult for the panchayat president in
the 2005 term (who is a sangha member) to make
unbiased decisions about the distribution of
material benefits as she has to conciliate local
leaders who wish to make money on contracts.
On the other hand, the alliances have helped
sangha members win positions as ward members,
and reduced election costs for contestants from
within the sangha when compared to those who
are associated with a political party. This has
made it more possible for sangha members from
poorer backgrounds to stand for elections. There
has been a steady increase in spending by
candidates over the period under study, and the
costs are making it increasingly prohibitive for
poor people to contest in panchayat elections.
Recent reports highlight that election spending
by candidates has increased dramatically in
parallel with the quantum of funds that are now
being made available to the lowest tier (see
Bhatt 2012).
At the same time, the intense competition for
ward member seats has led to more political
tension and divisions within the panchayat. This
has had knock-on effects on the sangha too. It has
made it easier for local political leaders from the
CPM to co-opt some of its leaders and exploit
existing divisions within the group. However,
sangha functionaries feel that this process of
weeding out weak leaders and individuals plays
an important part in securing the unity of the
group in the long run. These links between the
sangha and panchayats bring out the growing
relevance of politics in the everyday lives of poor
people. While this association has helped them
secure a degree of material benefits from local
government bodies, it is also creating new
tensions within the sangha, which in turn can
damage its unity and strength. These findings
extend the work by Govinda (2009) that unpacks
the trade-offs when NGOs try to mobilise their
target groups, and Mullen (2011) which
examines the potential of panchayats for citizens
and organised groups.
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In Donnapalli panchayat, NGO Akravati has played
an important role in building the awareness of
sangha members and mobilising them to raise
collective demands. It has provided information,
strategies, training, technical and logistic support
in relation to panchayats. NGO Akravati has also
supplemented the efforts of the sangha by liaising
with government officials, the MLA and other
political leaders at different tiers of government.
This has augmented the voice and influence of
sangha members as it has helped to step up the
pressure on leaders, elected functionaries and
officials, both within and outside the panchayat.
Given the hierarchical nature of village society,
NGO Akravati considers the involvement of its
sangha members in electoral activities and
confrontational collective action as a necessary
step towards the empowerment of poor people:
For us, politics is about securing access to
state resources. We are building the capacities
of sangha members so that they can do this.
The sangha is not vying for power; it is trying
to usher in a democratic culture whereby
voter interest is supreme… empowerment of
the traditionally marginalised has absolutely
no meaning without electoral involvement.
(NGO head, pers. comm. 2005)31
NGO Akravati has found that over time, with the
increasing political competition at the grass
roots and the institutionalisation of panchayats, it
has had to adapt and strengthen its involvement
in panchayat-related activities. However, its
awareness-raising and mobilisation measures
have brought it into conflict with certain local
political leaders and groups whose interests have
been threatened. While this has not resulted in
any serious setbacks, it has meant that at times
field staff (many of whom are sangha members)
have had to operate prudently. In addition, the
NGO has found that their efforts to build the
political capabilities of sangha members have
been thwarted by internal village and party
politics or by deliberate divisive measures
undertaken by those who oppose the sangha.
Senior staff are unperturbed as they feel that
these tensions and impediments are part of the
process of building the capabilities of vulnerable
and marginalised people. However, in the longer
term, the rise of small-time leaders and
associated groups could mean that NGO
Akravati finds it difficult to unite different
interest groups and sustain sangha mobilisation.
This account of the differing experiences of NGO
Akravati builds on existing literature (Rai et al.
2001; Chhotray 2008) that discusses the role that
NGOs (largely working in north and central India)
can potentially play in mobilising and building the
capacities of individuals and groups to participate
in panchayats. It does so by providing an insight into
the achievements, challenges and limitations faced
by an NGO (operating in the south Indian state of
Karnataka) that chooses to conscientise and
mobilise its target group in relation to panchayats.
In doing so, it draws attention to the role and
relevance of politics in shaping the experiences of
poor people, the functioning of panchayats, and the
interventions of NGOs.
In Donnapalli, poor people who are non-sangha
members are also recognising the value of
engaging in political participation. With the
incremental devolution of powers and funds to
gram panchayats, and the growing politicisation in
village society, they feel that even if they were
indifferent or reluctant in the past, they now
need to participate in political activities,
especially if they want to secure material
benefits from panchayats. Some of those who have
contacted elected functionaries, submitted
petitions or joined protests have found that these
different forms of political participation have
enabled them to voice their demands more
effectively. Others have found that voting
collectively as a group has placed them in a
better bargaining position, especially in their
dealings with traditional elites.
This perception that political participation is
becoming necessary has helped the sangha
expand membership among poor people in
Donnapalli. In turn, this has allowed the poor to
have a larger influence over the gram panchayat
election results, and hence potentially more say
over decision-making and the disbursement of
material benefits.
The changing political dynamics over the study
period indicate that interactions with traditional
elites are increasingly being governed by a
culture of negotiation rather than one of
patronage. Daftary (2010) finds similar changes
occurring in Gujarat and refers to this process of
bargaining and compromise as ‘brokerage’. Still
(2011) has also observed an erosion in the powers
of patronage in her research in the south Indian
state of Andhra Pradesh.
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Although I concur with Mansuri and Rao (2013)
that contextual differences need to be taken into
account in order to understand the different ways
in which poor people engage with traditional
elites and local government institutions, I argue
that similar changes in different parts of the
country suggest that Donnapalli’s experiences in
relation to the institutional electoral practices
and substantive politics might not be isolated.
This emphasis on context is also echoed in
Loera-Gonzalez’s study (this IDS Bulletin), on
the forms of resistance employed by the
Rarámuri people in Mexico. Unlike the sangha
members, the Rarámuri have not built ties with
external society but have responded to the
oppression they face by strengthening their
internal cohesion so that they can use their
cultural identity as a form of resistance. On the
other hand, in a setting like Donnapalli, poor
people are using the statutory provisions of local
government, combined with the information and
support provided by a local NGO to contact,
petition and agitate for individual and collective
benefits. Those that belong to the sangha are also
utilising collective mobilisation, electoral tactics
and party politics to secure incremental gains.
Thus, in Donnapalli, the sangha and its members
are beginning to both redefine and set the terms
on which poor people engage with local
government. Although the panchayat president
nominated by them is finding it hard to balance
different interests and the sangha is facing
threats to its unity, the political alliances and
strategies of the sangha are making it a force to
be reckoned with.
4 Conclusion
The longitudinal account of the changing
dynamics in Donnapalli gram panchayat has drawn
attention to the links between poor people,
panchayats, NGOs and politics. It has described
how panchayats can be harnessed by vulnerable
and marginalised people to usher in political and
socioeconomic change at the grass roots. In
addition, it has explained how and why it has
become increasingly necessary for poor people to
engage with politics – not just in terms of
institutional electoral practices but also in the
more substantive sense of redefining traditional
boundaries in order to gain access and influence
over decision-making and the distribution of
resources and benefits.
The article has highlighted how the constitutional
amendment in 1992, the incremental devolution of
funds and powers in Karnataka, and the presence
of an NGO working on panchayat-related issues
have helped to provide an enabling environment in
which poor people can engage in substantive
political participation. It has shown that in such a
context, an active engagement in different forms
of institutional electoral practices can help poor
people to have a larger influence over the
functioning of local government and greater access
to material benefits. By discussing the
engagement of poor people, NGOs and panchayats
in Donnapalli, it provides an insight into the
everyday practices and pitfalls of harnessing
democratic decentralisation in a context where an
organised group has used their collective strength
to deepen political participation. In doing so, it has
contributed to, and extended the literature on
democratic decentralisation, NGOs and politics.
The deepening politicisation in Donnapalli and
the devolution of funds is making more poor
people consider such an engagement as
necessary. However, such an involvement might
heighten existing tensions and expand political
and social divisions. Further research is required
to examine the extent and relevance of these
findings in other settings.
Reflecting back on these findings and the process
of data collection has reminded me of the
everyday struggles faced by many of the poor
people I interviewed. Although it has been very
encouraging to find that there is greater
awareness and willingness to participate in the
political process, it remains to be seen whether
poor people will be able to build on their strengths
and continue to reconfigure existing hierarchies.
Donnapalli’s experiences have highlighted how
the rise in political competition and the
representation of leadership from non-
traditional backgrounds has helped to bring
about incremental social change. However, the
article has also indicated that a proliferation of
leaders at the local level offers challenges to the
smooth functioning of both the sangha and the
panchayat. In doing so, it builds on existing
literature by providing fresh insights into the
political dynamics at the grass roots in India.
The growing authority of the gram panchayat also
draws attention to the need for NGOs to work
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with their target group on panchayat-related
issues. The article brings out the importance of
the role of NGOs in relation to local government.
In particular, it highlights the value of investing
efforts in building a collective and nurturing the
political capabilities of the group. The NGO can
build their awareness about various aspects of
panchayats, help them exercise voice, and support
them in their endeavours to undertake collective
confrontational action and secure an influential
role in local government. Poor people, like those
in the sangha, can help to make the decision-
making process within panchayats more
transparent, and the developmental outcomes
more equitable, but even they are susceptible to
political machinations and subject to internal
divisions.
Despite these challenges, Donnapalli’s account
shows us that both poor people and NGOs can
benefit from a greater involvement with panchayats.
Furthermore, with the deepening politicisation at
the grass roots and the progressively higher
devolution of resources, it has become increasingly
necessary for poor people to engage in different
aspects of political participation.
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Notes
1 In 1992, the 73rd constitutional amendment
paved the way for the Indian system of three-
tiered decentralised government within rural
parts of an individual state – district (zilla
panchayat), sub-district or intermediate (taluk
panchayat in Karnataka) and village (gram
panchayat). The term Panchayati Raj
Institutions (PRIs) includes all three tiers of
panchayats. All references to ‘panchayat’ refer to
the statutory panchayats.
2 Scheduled Castes (SCs) include the former
untouchables or outcastes, castes which lie
outside the traditional four-fold hierarchy and
Scheduled Tribes (STs) (indigenous tribes),
are accorded special constitutional status in
view of the discrimination they have suffered
in the past from mainstream Hindu society. 
3 NGOs (non-governmental organisations) are
defined here as ‘self-governing, private, not-
for-profit organisations that are geared to
improving the quality of life of disadvantaged
people’ (Vakil 1997: 2060). This definition
places emphasis on the ‘developmental’ role of
NGOs and excludes organisations such as
‘business, professional, recreational, cultural
and strictly religious organisations that are
usually considered as part of the non-profit
sector’ (ibid.).
4 I define these as NGOs that operate in a
specific geographical arena, namely, the
sub-district administrative division.
5 This characterisation draws on Manor’s
description of politics as ‘the interplay of
interests and forces in pursuit of power,
resources, status etc.’ (2004: 205). 
6 The traditional four-fold hierarchy consists of
four varnas (categories): Brahmin (priest),
Kshatriya (warrior), Vaishya (merchant) and
Shudras (peasant, service and artisan castes).
‘Upper castes’ normally refers to castes
belonging to the first three varnas.
7 Following Srinivas, ‘dominant’ is understood
to refer to castes that control a substantial
portion of landholdings associated with the
village, have a sizeable (does not imply
majority) numerical strength within the
village that translates into socioeconomic
standing and control over political patronage,
possess the hereditary headman’s post, and
enjoy a relatively ‘high’ status within the
traditional caste hierarchy (1959).
8 The period covers two full five-year electoral
terms of gram panchayats and one year of the
third electoral term.
9 When selecting poor respondents for survey
interviews I followed a three-stage strategy.
Firstly, I collected information about a
potential list of interviewees in a general
group discussion. I then triangulated this
information with key informants from both
the well-off and poor categories. Finally, I did
a round of the village and gauged their
situation for myself. This information in
tandem with research criteria helped me draw
up the final list of respondents. I administered
surveys to both sangha and non-sangha
members (men and women). The majority of
the respondents were from the Scheduled
Caste community and were daily-wage
labourers.
10 Telugu is the language associated with the
state of Andhra Pradesh and Kannada is the
language associated with Karnataka.
However, the people in this legislative
constituency within Karnataka largely speak
Telugu as the area borders the state of
Andhra Pradesh.
11 Interview with panchayat secretary No. 14,
2 September 2006, Kolar.
IDSB45.2-3 text.qxd  05/02/2014  15:39  Page 67
12 This district was part of Kolar district during the
study. In 2007, Kolar was bifurcated and this
panchayat became part of Chikballapur district.
13 Names of NGO, legislative constituency, gram
panchayat, and key people in this area have
been altered.
14 This is often shortened to CPM.
15 An influential caste grouping belonging to the
Shudra varna.
16 He stood as an independent during elections
as he was not selected as the official candidate
by the Congress party. However, he continues
to be affiliated to the Congress.
17 Interviews with MLA, NGO Akravati staff and
functionaries of sangha, Kolar, 2006.
18 Elections for all three tiers of panchayats were
held in 1994–5, 2000 and 2005. The pattern of
CPM dominance in the upper tiers was only
broken in the 2005 term, when a zilla panchayat
member from the Congress party got elected.
19 The Karnataka Panchayati Raj Act provides
reservations for marginalised communities
(women, religious minorities, SC/STs and
backward castes) both for the post of ward
member and GP president. 
20 Since 2000, gram panchayat terms in Karnataka
have been split into two equal halves.
Reservations for the post of panchayat president
are ‘rotated’ mid-way through the term allowing
for two presidential tenures of 30 months each.
21 Karnataka has a system of indirect elections
for the gram panchayat president. Ward
(council) members elect an appropriate
candidate from amongst themselves, based on
the reservation ‘category’. In practice, heavy
contestation means that the largest number of
like-minded ward members (invariably same
political-party affiliation) has the final say in
making this decision.
22 Interview with elected male member No. 39,
31 August 2006, Kolar.
23 Technically, he belongs to the same caste
grouping as the landowning family but he
comes from a lower class.
24 Interview with elected male member No. 38,
31 August 2006, Kolar.
25 Interview with sangha functionary No. 5,
26 August 2006, Kolar.
26 Interview with knowledgeable informant
No. 48, 28 August 2006, Kolar.
27 Interview with NGO head, 12 October 2005,
Kolar.
28 Interview with key informant from the
dominant caste, 30 August 2006, Kolar.
29 The gram panchayats now receive a sizeable
proportion of the funds under the Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) of 2005.
30 Interview with sangha functionary No. 5,
26 August 2006, Kolar.
31 Interview with NGO head, 12 October 2005,
Kolar.
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